Increasing investment in human resource relative to information technology system in retail banking delivery channels increases the optimal bank interest margin and decreases the default risk in the bank's equity returns during a financial crisis. Raising the regulatory barrier inducing a wealth transfer from shareholders to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reinforces both the effects above. Human resource investment with regulatory deposit insurance fund protection as such make the distressed bank more prudent to risk-taking, thereby contributing to the stability of the banking system.
Introduction
The banking industry is experiencing a renewed focus on retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability and profitability of retail activities (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007) . This note discusses one recent trend of the return to retail banking during a financial crisis and places it in the larger context of alternative delivery channels and bank regulation. Alternative delivery channels in retail banking can be motivated based on an argument about human resource investment relative to information technology investment in the spirit of Harangus (2009) and Kondo (2010) (Note 1). Parallel to an increased importance of the return to retail banking, there has been an ongoing discussion about the role of deposit insurance fund protection to influence bank behavior and make banks more robust against financial shocks, i.e., to strengthen the soundness and stability of banks in the usual parlance of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Bank regulation in retail banking can be motivated based on the deposit insurance fund protection under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (Episcopos, 2008) .
In this note, the barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank to address the problem of early bank closure during a financial crisis (Episcopos, 2008) . The FDIC as a regulator/insurer of the bank owns a down-and-in call (DIC) option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost. We show that, as the bank increases its human resource management relative to its information technology investment, the optimal bank interest margin is increased, and the default risk in the bank's equity returns is reduced. Our findings are consistent with Harangus (2009) : human capital may produce superior return performance and greater safety for the bank. In addition, the positive impact on the margin and the negative impact on the default risk are reinforced as the regulatory barrier increases. Our findings are supported by Episcopos (2008) . In conclusion, human resource management and deposit insurance fund protection as such make the bank less prone to risk-taking in retail banking activities, thereby contributing to the banking stability. 
The Model
This condition implies that the bank exercises some monopoly power in its loan market (Mukuddem-Petersen et al., 2008) . The bank holds liquid asset B that earns the security-market interest rate of R . When the capital requirement constraint is binding, the bank's balance-sheet constraint at
The bank's objective is to set L R to maximize the market value of a barrier option function (Brockman and Turtle, 2003) defined in terms of profits, subject to Eq. (1). In this context, the market value of the bank's equity S can be written as (Note 2):
where . A backward technology related to investment in human resource management can be identified as a higher c with a lower F , while an advanced technology related to investment in information technology management can be identified as a lower c with a higher F .  is the compounded riskless rate of the strike price Z in the call option. H is the value of the bank's assets that triggers bankruptcy (this is the barrier on knock-out value of the bank). For tractability, it is assumed that the default barrier level H is proportional to the bank's net-obligation payments Z by a barrier-to-debt ratio
( ) N  is the standard normal cumulative distribution. The first term ]
[ on the right-hand side of negatively to bankruptcy probability. In conclusion, it is shown that human capital investment and regulatory barrier as such contribute retail banking stability. One issue that has not been addressed is that the impact of different types of human resource management related to employee perceptions of human resource policies and work practices on bank performance is heterogeneous. Is it the case that the results of this paper also apply to the heterogeneous case? Such concerns are beyond the scope of this paper, and so are not addressed here. What this paper does demonstrate, however, is the important role played by human resource investment in affecting bank performance and regulation effectiveness of the banking system.
